The Death-Beam Gap
Putting Keegan's Follies in Perspective
John Pike - October 1992
In May 1977 the American national security community was startled by a report in the respected trade journal Aviation Week & Space Technology concerning Soviet progress in directed energy weapons. For several years Major General George J. Keegan, head of Air Force intelligence, had been monitoring Soviet developments since 1973, and attempting since 1975 to convince the American military and intelligence community of an impending directed energy weapons gap. With his retirement in January 1977, he went public with his case. It was reported that:(1)
"In increasing numbers, U.S. officials are coming to a conclusion that a decisive turn in the balance of strategic power is in the making, which could tip that balance heavily in the Soviet's favor through charged particle beam development ... Most of the controversy centers on what tests are being conducted in an unusual research facility about 35 mi. south of the city of Semipalatinsk."
Aviation Week editorialized that:(2)
"The Soviet Union has achieved a technical breakthrough in high-energy physics applications that may soon provide it with a directed-energy beam weapon capable of neutralizing the entire United States ballistic missile force and checkmating this country's strategic doctrine... The race to perfect directed-energy weapons is a reality. Despite initial skepticism, the U.S. scientific community is now pressuring for accelerated efforts in this area."
This controversy reached the highest levels of the American government. President Jimmy Carter responded that:(3)
"... we do not see any likelihood at all, based on our constant monitoring of the Soviet Union, that they have any prospective breakthrough in a new weapons system that would endanger our country."
And Defense Secretary Harold Brown concluded:(4)
"It is, in my view, and that of all the technically qualified people whom I know who've looked at the whole thing, without foundation, the evidence does not support the view that the Soviets have made such a breakthrough or indeed that they are very far along in such a direction."
The Central Intelligence Agency stated that it did:(5)
" ... not believe that the Soviet Union has achieved a breakthrough which could lead to a charged particle beam weapon capable of neutralizing ballistic missiles."
The former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, LTG Daniel O. Graham concluded that Keegan's analysis was built on too many assumptions:(6)
" ... one worst case analysis may be right, but something that depends on a whole group of them never is."
And the Acting Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, VADM Bobby Inman, responding to Congressional inquiries about Soviet particle beam progress, stated:(7)
"There is no basis in available evidence to ascribe to the Soviet Union success in the development of such a weapon."
Nonetheless, the furor created by General Keegan's charges provided the political impetus for a significant expansion of the American directed energy program by the Carter Administration. A major space-based laser effort was initiatied under the auspices of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Work began on the ALPHA chemical laser project in 1978. Contracts for the TALON GOLD targetting system were awarded in 1979. And the Large Optics Demonstration Experiment (LODE) started in 1980. These activities subsequently formed the basis for the Strategic Defense Initiative.
i - Misreading the Evidence
Several types of activity at Semipalatinsk were interpreted as indicating particle beam weapon work. However, it is now clear that each of these observed activities were in fact part of the Soviet nuclear rocket program. Suggestions that the rocket test stands at Semipalatinsk had been improperly interpreted as directed energy weapons facilities were first raised in early 1992.(8) But the September 1992 tour of Semipalatinsk has clarified this long-standing mystery.
A number of activities observed in the mid-1970s, which Keegan and his supporters interpreted as evidence of a Soviet beam weapon program, are now clearly revealed as aspects of the Soviet nuclear rocket program.
A - LARGE BUILDING
The facility at Semipalatinsk was identified by the Air Force as PNUT - Possible Nuclear Underground Test, and by the Central Intelligence Agency as URDF-3 - Unidentified Research and Development Facility Three. General Keegan predicted that this facility would become fully operational by 1980. It was reported that:(9)
"The central building at the facility is believed by some officials to contain a collective accelerator, electron injectors and power sources. The building is 200 ft. wide and 700 ft. long, with walls of reinforced concrete 10 ft. thick."
In reality, this large building was the reactor test facility. The large size of the facility was dictated by the requirement to simultaneously service three test reactors.(10)
B - UNDERGROUND SPHERES
One activity related to the construction of a series of large underground spheres. It was reported that:(11)
"The U.S. used high-resolution photographic reconnaissance satellites to watch as the Soviet technicians had four holes dug through solid granite formations not far from the main building at the facility. Mine heads were constructed over the each opening, and frames were built over the holes. As tons of rock were removed, a large underground chamber was built deep inside the rock formation.
"In a nearby building, huge, extremely thick steel gores were manufactured. The building has since been removed. These steel segments were parts of a large sphere estimated to be about 18 meters (57.8 ft.) in diameter. Enough gores for two complete spheres were constructed."
It was reported that:(12)
"U.S. officials believe the spheres are needed to capture and store energy from nuclear-driven explosives or pulse-power generators. The steel gores are believed by some officials to be among the earliest clues as to what might be taking place at the facility."
The reality was more prosaic. The Baikal-1 nuclear rocket test facility included three large underground tanks for storage of liquid hydrogen.(13) These were fabricated on-site out of large "orange-peel slice" metal gores, and situated underground to provide structural support. The gaps between the spherical holes in the bedrock and the tanks were filled with concrete. This permitted the use of relatively thin metal segments. In 1982, one of the tanks developed a leak, and became unusable.
C - LIQUID HYDROGEN TANK CARS
Another line of evidence was based on the fact that:(14)
"Photographs from satellites also revealed a number of tank cars near the test site loaded with liquid hydrogen."
General Keegan and his supporters contended that the liquid hydrogen:(15)
"... was being used by the Soviets for cryogenic pumping of beam drift tubes..."
which were seen as part of the focusing mechanism for the particle beam weapon. The reality, of course, is that these tank cars carried the liquid hydrogen that was stored in the underground tanks.
D - SENSOR RINGS
A further point of interest stemmed from the fact that:(16)
"At one time, there were five concentric rings constructed around the building about 5 km. (3.1 mi.) apart. At each 5 deg. of arc, a vertical sensor was placed. At first, U.S. analysts believed this arrangement was to monitor movement of gaseous hydrogen clouds. The geometry was so precise, however, that some believed that the sensors were located to measure beam impact of for beam tracking."
The more prosaic initial assessment was correct. The sensors were emplaced around the rocket test facility to monitor radiation releases from the open-air rocket tests.
E - HYDROGEN FLAMES
It was also reported that:(17)
"Detection of large amounts of gaseous hydrogen with traces of tritium in the upper atmosphere. The USAF/TRW Block 647 defense support program early warning satellite with scanning radiation detectors and infrared sensors has been used to determine that on seven occasions since November, 1975, tests that may be related to development of a charged-particle beam device have been carried out in a facility at Semipalatinsk."
"There is now no doubt that there is dumping of energy taking place at the site, with burning of large hydrogen flames."
These observations, of course, were the testing of the nuclear rocket reactors, which released large flames of hydrogen propellant.
ii - Sources of Confusion
The confusion about Semipalatinsk was not limited to the American side. It was suggested that, on the basis of Western reports:(18)
" ... many young Russian scientists in the 1980s were thrilled to be sent to Semipalatinsk, where they assumed they would be working on "Keegan's beam" ... Apparently they were disappointed that it did not exist. Consequently, morale suffered."
The primary source of confusion over the Semipalatinsk facility was the predilection for worst-case assessments by some elements of the American intelligence community. As had been the case in previous episodes such as the bomber gap, the missile gap, and the mine shaft gap, such worst-case assessments were supported by those whose programs would benefit by additional funding and expanded political influence.
There were, however, mitigating factors that helped engender the mis-perception of Semipalatinsk. The American difficulties in assessing this facility were aggravated by the Soviet practice of scheduling reactor tests during periods in which the test facility would not be observed by American imaging intelligence satellites.(19)
In addition, the Soviet nuclear rocket testing program had not commenced until after the termination of the American nuclear rocket program. In the absence of an announced Soviet program, and in the absence of an apparent mission application for nuclear propulsion, it would not be difficult to look for other explanations. While a variety of interpretations were offered for the Semipalatinsk facility, there is no indication that nuclear rocket testing was offered as a potential explanation for the observed activity.
And the American association of the Semipalatinsk facility with directed energy weapons was not entirely misplaced.(20) It was suggested that a reactor was used to supply supersonic hydrogen gas flow for a gas dynamic laser. And although the IGR reactor was initially developed to test nuclear propulsion components, it was also used to test nuclear reactor-pumped laser concepts, similar to the FALCON concept tested in the United States.
iii - Open Questions
Despite the wealth of new information on the Soviet nuclear rocket program, some matters require further clarification:
What reactor was observed being tested in 1976, and what was the source that collected this information? Reportedly American intelligence observed over half a dozen tests in the 1976 time-frame, which would appear inconsistent with the Soviet reports of test dates. Although it may be assumed that these tests were monitored by the American Defense Support Program early warning satellites as well as reconnaissance aircraft, it is not immediately obvious how these systems would detect large flares of hot hydrogen with tritium contaminants.
Resolution of these questions would further clarify the history of the Soviet nuclear rocket program. Nonetheless, it is now clear that General Keegan's misidentification of the Baikal-1 nuclear rocket test facility must rank as one of the major intelligence failures of the Cold War.
1. Robinson, Clarence, "Soviets Push for Beam Weapon," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 2 May 1977, page 17.
2. Hotz, Robert, "Beam Weapon Threat," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 2 May 1977, page 11.
3. Dobbin, Muriel, "Moscow Yet to Develop Laser Weapon, Carter Says," Baltimore Sun, 4 May 1977, page 8.
4. "Brown Comments on Beam Weapons," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 30 May 1977, page 12.
5. Wade, Nicholas, "Charged Debate Erupts over Russian Beam Weapon," Science, 27 May 1977, pages 957-959.
7. "Beam Weapon Herings Due in Congress," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 30 May 1977, pages 17-18.
8. Broad, William, "Russian Scientists to Detail Plans For a Fast Nuclear Space Rocket," The New York Times, 13 January 1992, pages A1, B10.
9. Robinson, Clarence, "Soviets Push for Beam Weapon," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 2 May 1977, page 17.
10. Kennel, Elliot, "Trip Report: Trip to Moscow and Semipalatinsk Nuclear Weapons Proving Ground," 11-28 September 1992, page 5.
11. Robinson, Clarence, "Soviets Push for Beam Weapon," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 2 May 1977, page 17.
12. ibid, page 17.
13. Kennel, Elliot, "Trip Report: Trip to Moscow and Semipalatinsk Nuclear Weapons Proving Ground," 11-28 September 1992, page 5.
14. Robinson, Clarence, "Soviets Push for Beam Weapon," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 2 May 1977, page 20.
17. ibid, pages 16, 19.
18. Kennel, Elliot, "Trip Report: Trip to Moscow and Semipalatinsk Nuclear Weapons Proving Ground," 11-28 September 1992, page 5.
19. ibid, page 3.
20. ibid, page 6.