Keith Wilkes

Major, United States Marine Corps

21 June 1995

United States Marine Corps

Command and Staff College

Quantico, Virginia 22134




The time period is March 1997. There has been little calm in the continent of Africa, especially North Africa. This hostile climate has manifested itself primarily between the nations of Tunisia and Libya. Libya has been aggressively disputing the oil facilities and oilfields of Tunisia. The Libyan's hostile attitude and intentions are a result of their poor economy and backward world position caused by the continued economic embargo imposed by the United Nations.

This situation comes to a head when on April 1,1997, the Libyans launch a major ground attack against Tunisia with two Corps of both mechanized and light infantry. The forces appear to be in pursuit of two objectives: controlling the Tunisian oil production facilities and possessing the oil fields in the northern and coastal regions of Tunisia.

The Tunisian government has asked for United Nations' support and a world condemnation of the aggressive Libyan attack into their sovereign territory. However, even in 1997, the world community is still smarting from the Tunisian refusal to support and participate against Iraq during the Gulf War of 1990-1991. The President of Tunisia has personally asked for help from the United States, specifically telephoning the President. In response and in preparation for possible hostilities in this unstable region, the President has asked the JCS to prepare for possible commitment of American forces into Tunisia. These American forces may have to be committed unilaterally. The JCS have, in turn, tasked CINCEUR to prepare for deployment to the region, first to defend the nation of Tunisia and then to restore stability to the region. The JCS has dubbed the operation "African Aegis".

As the next few days progress, the situation worsens with Libyan forces pressing closer into the heartland of Tunisia, threatening to cut the nation in half. This effort will sever the capital and port facilities from the rest of the country. At this juncture, this action seriously threatens oil fields and oil production facilities. The heartland of Tunisia is in Libyan possession.

The NCA has tasked CINCEUR with moving forces immediately to Tunisia to defend the capital and oil facilities and then to prepare for follow-on operations to expel the Libyan forces from Tunisia. The CINC moves a US Army mechanized division and a USAF air wing into the region. The USAF air wing consists of fighters, fighter-bombers, tankers, and E/W assets. Lastly, the CINC commits a USMC MEF with an associated MPS offload. The US Army and most Marine Corps' assets and personnel will use the port of Tunis for offloading.

Italy has approved the use of Sicilian airfields and port facilities to all US forces and the US Air Force will base most of its combat power in those facilities. The government of Tunisia has approved the use of all of national transportation and logistical infrastructure by US forces. This appears to set the stage for a possible repeat of Desert Shield/Storm, whereby US and coalition forces come to the aid of a sovereign nation, defend it, and then pursue offensive means to expel the aggressor.

The news media is reporting "live" the movement of forces into the region, to include broadcasting from the actual logistical facilities in both Tunisia and Sicily. Through a press conference, the President has spoken to the nation, conveying the intentions of the US Government and his rationale concerning the possible unilateral use of American forces. He states that "the US will defend Tunisia, with possible follow-on operations to expel Libyan forces from Tunisia. Tunisia is of vital interest to the stability of the region and the continued stability of the US and World economy."

The Marines are undergoing an administrative offload of the MPS at the port of Tunis. This follows an assessment that this region of Tunisia is under no immediate threat from the Libyan forces. Also, personnel of the MEF are flying into the airport at Tunis. The USAF is flying in equipment and personnel to Sicilian and Tunisian airfields. Thus far, the operation is going relatively smoothly with American combat power arriving in the AO as quickly as possible. The establishment of lodgment, staging, and operational facilities is also proceeding well.

Suddenly on April 6th, explosions and fallout from both high explosive and chemically armed ballistic missiles engulf the port and airfield of Tunis. Similar attacks occur on the airfields in Sicily. The TBMs originate from well within Libyan territory and appear to be between thirty and forty in number.

Many casualties result, mostly from fragmentation and chemical fallout. The attacks also damage many aircraft with several destroyed on the airfields. They also sink one of the MPS ships at port, with several more severely damaged. The port area of Tunis is hit especially hard with many deaths associated with the sinking of the MPS ship while its offload was in progress.

The ballistic missile attack has placed operation "African Aegis" in serious jeopardy. The CINC has temporarily halted all operations until he can determine the gravity of the situation and can verify the extent of the damage. It is obvious that the Libyan TBM capability far exceeded what US forces expected. The ballistic missiles were much better in range and accuracy and had a tremendous impact upon the progress and success of operation "African Aegis".


Is the foregoing situation plausible? Could such a threat catch the US by surprise in an operation such as this? The tragedy described above is only imaginary, but I would emphasize, very plausible. The days of inaccurate TBMs are rapidly coming to an end. There are many nations today who can field and employ a sophisticated TBM capability.

The environment today requires that US forces, especially Marines, prepare themselves to deploy into almost any type of contingency, in almost any place in the world. This will likely be the "modus operandi" for many years to come. Will Marines have to face such a threat? Is this type of threat going to become more sophisticated as the years progress?

The current fiscal situation in our country has caused our leaders to take a serious look at the composition, size, and capabilities of our armed forces. This reduction in size and capabilities will continue into the foreseeable future, barring some great world war or catastrophe. Given this downswing, many consider it improper for each service to employ a capability that is resident in any other service. Many Congressmen are asking questions concerning the cost effectiveness of what appears to be similar capabilities in each service. This environment has led to many concerns and discussions over reducing service duplications in both capabilities and assets. In air defense for example, there has been a tremendous debate over whether to keep the HAWK system in the USMC. Also, given the TBM threat, should each service deploy an air defense capability to counter this threat, or should the services share this responsibility? More specifically, is it proper to expect the USMC to deploy some kind of organic TBM defense given the US Army possesses PATRIOT?

The US Army is out of the HAWK missile business and has passed on to the National Guard most of these assets. David Hughes stated in Aviation Week & Space Technology on April 4, 1994, that "... the US Army has deactivated the last of its HAWK missile battalions, leaving just four battalions in the Army National Guard even though 20 Allied nations including South Korea continue to use the system" (1) The US Army had even threatened to stop supporting the weapon system entirely, to the consternation of both the USMC and the National Guard. However, as of December 16, 1994, the US Army has decided to continue supporting the HAWK system in the National Guard.(2) This means that if the Marine Corps and National Guard continue to possess the weapon system, the US Army will continue to support it.

Further, Joint Operations are here to stay, and the USMC will probably never deploy as a sole force in operations of any sufficient size and importance. Most operations that encompass the vital interests of this nation will require the use of forces and capabilities from all of our armed services. Given this, if and when there is a TBM threat, it is prudent to expect that the Patriot system will attempt to provide TBM defense for all US forces deployed. However, this begs the following question: Can PATRIOT provide TBM defense of USMC expeditionary forces? Will PATRIOTS go where Marines go?

These several questions form the basis and also prepare the groundwork for my thesis: The Marine Corps should develop, test, and possess its own organic TBM capability. As you will see, these efforts involve upgrading the capabilities of the HAWK missile system, as well as the AN\TPS-59 radar and the development of the ADCP. And, the Corps should interface this capability into the other service systems such as Patriot, Aegis, and THAAD. Through my analysis in developing my thesis, I will also address the questions above concerning PATRIOT and its capability of protecting Marine expeditionary forces. This will in part answer the question of the necessity for the USMC to possess its own inherent TBM capability.

My approach in addressing the thesis will be as follows: First, I will present and analyze the threat, in terms of weapon systems capabilities, the nations involved, and the pursuit of future improvements in capability. I will further discuss likely scenarios in which the USMC may find itself, to include the potential TBM threat for those scenarios. This will lead into a discussion of the PATRIOT system, the only real alternative weapon system besides HAWK capable of some kind of TBM defense for US Marine forces. This discussion will address several limitations of the PATRIOT system, specifically analyzing particular applications for possibly supporting Expeditionary Marine Forces. Further, I will discuss the capabilities of the HAWK system, especially highlighting the system's inherent capabilities against TBMs. I will also discuss the current program to upgrade the HAWK system in the USMC to make it more capable against a broader range of TBM threats. Then I will consider the thesis and the applicability of the HAWK system for Marine Corps TBM defense.

I will close with a discussion of the programs the other services either possess or are pursuing to provide some kind of TBM defense capability. Also, I will propose how the USMC can best integrate with these systems to provide the most effective air defense effort against this type of threat. Finally, I will highlight an employment opportunity by combining the new ERINT missile and HAWK which could provide an extremely effective and expeditionary TBM defense capability.


A discussion of the thesis would not be appropriate without an analysis of the threat. Over the last thirty years or so, TBMs have been produced with varying degrees of capability in range and payload. They have been traditionally very crude in construction and design, but this aspect is changing. Several nations have been at the forefront of their production, most notably the former Soviet Union, China, and the U.S. The Soviet Union has produced many of the ballistic missiles in use today. China has also been a major contributor and exporter of this weapon. Also, the U.S. has produced several variants. The ballistic missile weapon system has made significant gains as a military capability in the past ten or so years. The question becomes--- why has this system become so popular, especially among Third world countries? And, what are its several variants, capabilities, and planned improvements? I will begin with an analysis of why smaller nations consider TBMs worth possessing, followed by a brief discussion of proliferation. I will also highlight both current and future ballistic missile capabilities and trends. In these opening pages, I will also discuss several countries that possess TBMs which could pose a threat to Marine Corps expeditionary forces.

Why TBMs?

Ballistic missiles have existed for some time, beginning with the Second World War. Throughout the Cold War period, their utility existed. The Soviets produced these weapons for deployment in Eastern Europe. Why do TBMs possess an attraction as a popular weapon of choice of among third world nations and the rogue states in the world (Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya)?

We will begin by first considering one of the basic reasons for possessing this weapon system: it provides the user strategic power and status. Third World nations are scrambling for both respect and status in the world community. In their view, they can best attain this position by obtaining military capability. This respect must come through military exploits; however, it must come at the least expense. For many nations, these missile systems have different symbolic representations. " The type of chosen weapon for use may be considered tactical/operational to US planners, but is frequently strategic to a nation in the market for a deterrent weapon."(3) Also, the possession of TBM weapon systems will provide the user in many cases with the feeling they are moving up in the world, and now the world will have to seriously consider them as a player. A 1990 Rand Note states that "Ballistic Missiles add several important new dimensions to the threat. Missiles are a symbol of modern military power, seemingly providing a high level of prestige among developing nations."(4) Many nations view possession of these systems as a "... rite of national passage out of technological backwardness."(5) In this era of military dominance by the US, developing nations see the ballistic missile weapon system as one way to be considered strategically viable. K. Subrahmanyam, the leading Indian strategic analyst, best encapsulates this concept following India's testing of its new TBM, the Agni IRBM. He states, " Its role as a weapon is the least of its roles. It is a confidence builder and a symbol of India's assertion of self-reliance not merely in defense but in the broader international political arena as well." TBMs are one way that a nation may receive better strategic consideration.

Developing nations also seek the TBM as a deterrent. Its capability to reach out across long distances, often throughout a large region, requires bordering nations to at least respect the sovereignty and intentions of a country possessing a TBM. The mere fact that a nation possesses this weapon will provide some kind of deterrence against possible hostile intentions of a bordering nation.

At this point, it is worth discussing several nations to analyze why they possess this weapon as a deterrent. Israel, for example, has a clear need for possessing weapons of deterrence, especially given its short borders and small strategic depth. Israel clearly considers its Jericho missiles armed with nuclear warheads as a deterrence against aggression.(6)

The nation of India sees China as a chief adversary and also appears to pursue possession of TBMs as a clear deterrent against hostile aggression. The Chinese have long possessed this kind of capability and in response, the Indians could use TBMs as a method of delivery.(7)

Also, the nation of Syria relies upon TBMs as a strategic deterrent against Israel. If armed with chemical warheads, these TBMs create for Israel a serious strategic challenge that they must carefully consider. The threat of such missiles may also deter Israeli conventional aircraft attacks against Syria.(8) One can conclude from these examples that TBMs provide some level of strategic deterrence for the possessor of this system.

To continue the analysis of why nations opt for TBMs, one needs also to consider the world's air forces and military aircraft. It should be clear that one criteria of technological prowess and world power associates the possession of a sophisticated air force with power and prestige. The privileged nations of the world have this capability. It provides a nation with global reach and strategic power. However, to be effective, this type of capability requires a large investment in both material and manpower. It is in the ability to resource an air force where third world nations come up short. They do not have the funds to purchase sophisticated aircraft nor the capacity to train pilots and technicians. Thus, they turn to the option of TBMs. As seen in the discussion above, they provide strategic capability and powerful deterrence. As Seth Carus states, " ... missiles have operational military roles, substituting for small or ineffective air forces or acting as useful complements."(9) TBMs can become the poor man's air force, taking the role that first rate air forces have traditionally filled. "In addition, missiles may put within range those targets that are beyond the range of combat aircraft."(10) Also, in contrast to aircraft, missiles do not place expensively trained air crews at the risk of being either killed or captured.(11) TBMs provide terrific bang for the buck.

The military use of TBMs also provides a nation the capacity to engage targets almost with impunity and absolute assurance that the missile will hit close to the intended target without fear of the missile's destruction. Along with this comes the elements of speed and surprise, both of which enhance the strategic deterrence and power associated with these types of missiles. "The high speed for ballistic missiles enables an attacker to strike with little warning and makes it very difficult for the defender to destroy incoming missiles."(12) This type of weapon assures the possessing nation a capability to attack knowing, the missile will penetrate. The opposing nation will have little or no warning that an attack is taking place. This provides a serious military capability to any nation that possesses this weapon system, however backward or poor it may be.

TBM Proliferation

TBM proliferation is a complex and yet frightening aspect of this weapon system that we must also examine in this analysis. A look at proliferation will demonstrate the technology flowing worldwide and the sheer numbers of nations involved. The recent fall of the Soviet Union and the global international economy have fostered this interchange of both military and industrial technologies that has helped fuel the development and improvement of the capability of TBMs. Because of the need for hard cash to finance the international technological boom, nations possessing the necessary technology have sold guidance, warhead, and missile technologies to many third world countries. "Countries, firms, and individual scientists and engineers have often provided developing countries with missile technology or even components."(13) This flow has not only been within the eastern bloc, but also to Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, and Syria. Many of these technologically advanced countries have also helped North Korea, Pakistan, South Africa, and Taiwan. China is also a culprit in this international technology proliferation.(14) Third world nations are clearly exporting to others as well as receiving technology from the larger powers in the world. Also, the phenomena termed dual use technology exists. Nations currently involved in space programs have the capability and propensity to also involve themselves in rocket production and satellite systems guidance and development. These technologies have corresponding applicability to TBM development and production.(15)

As discussed above, the reasons for possessing TBMs are varied and somewhat complex, but they all lead to a global proliferation of this type of technology. This weapon system will continue to see utility among third world nations as long as it possesses military utility and a capability to provide some semblance of strategic power. Chart 1 in the Appendix graphically depicts the significant interchange and intertwining of nations involved in this technology proliferation which have an impact on nations in the Middle East.

Capabilities---Now and in The Future

I would like to continue with a discussion of current TBM capabilities , as well as what is in store in the foreseeable future. This is necessary in order to highlight just what these systems can do so that the reader will have a clear understanding of TBM capabilities and as well, limitations. I will also present future developments to provide an understanding on the improvements of the TBMs versatility and capability.

Range, Accuracy, and Payloads

First, I would like to discuss the weapons' range, accuracy, and payloads. A quick look at Chart 4 in the Appendix will suffice at this point. It is clear that there are many different derivatives of the basic SCUD missile first introduced by the Russians many years ago. Also, one should notice the accuracy and payloads associated with many of these systems. Range and accuracy are somewhat suspect on many systems, but utilizing unconventional warheads such as nuclear or chemical significantly improves their utility and impact. The following information from Rand Note N-2985-A/OSD presents a synopsis of the information depicted in Chart 4:

* Current TBMs have:

-- Unitary conventional warheads

-- 300m CEP or greater

* Current technology may allow for:

-- Cluster munitions (Egyptian experiments)

-- 100m CEP (improved inertial guidance)

-- Chemical warheads

* Advanced technology would be required for:

-- 50m accuracy

-- Smart munitions (16)

A brief discussion of the various warheads is appropriate. The more conventional of these is the High Explosive or HE. These warheads come in various weights and various effectiveness. They typically cause tremendous damage on impact and also cause blast waves and debris which cover a large area. "Modern high explosives , including those produced by Brazil and probably other countries ... , are many times more powerful than TNT (trinitrotoluene)."(17) For example, the blast from a 1,000 pound HE warhead "...would generally destroy buildings within a radius of 110-140 feet from the explosion; would cause serious damage to buildings of standard construction within a radius of 150-180 feet; and would cause deaths and injuries from flying projectiles to double that distance."(18) Also, one must consider the supersonic speeds at which TBMs travel and the correlating damage from the impact of the missile because of sheer momentum. "The SCUD-B travels at three times the speed of sound when it lands, not only exploding unexpended fuel but causing considerable damage with the impact of its two-ton missile fuselage."(19)

Chemical, biological,and nuclear warheads add another entirely new dimension to this weapon. First, nations are actively developing chemical warheads and are, quite possibly, fielding them with TBMs. These warheads provide a dramatic addition to the TBMs effectiveness, countering some of its inherent inaccuracy by spreading contaminants over a large area. This will render an area occupied by personnel and equipment ineffective for some time.

"In the third world, chemical weapons are seen as the 'poor man's nuclear weapon.'"(20) This clearly depicts the perception of many small powers that chemical warheads and TBMs are a deadly, effective, and capable combination. However, the most profound aspect of chemical warheads is the correlation that exists between nations that have chemical weapons capability and also possess a TBM capability. "There are few countries with ballistic missiles that are not seeking to develop a chemical capability and only a few countries with chemical weapons not developing a ballistic missile capability ."(21) These nations almost assuredly have both the capability and desire to place chemical warheads on TBMs. Note Chart 2 in the Appendix for a further look at this correlation between TBMs and chemical weapon production.

Further, "the analysis shows that use of even today's ballistic missile systems with chemical weapons could represent a major military threat for which the United States is relatively unprepared."(22) The use of this capability could be most damaging to USMC operations. Marine Corps operations are typically expeditionary and rely upon establishing a secure and safe lodgment area to provide for the follow-on MPS offload. The same RAND Note states that "... chemical weapons may represent a particularly effective threat against rapid deployment forces."(23) Chart 5 in the appendix is quite enlightening and graphically depicts the capabilities of chemical agents.

Biological agents added to TBMs are equally as deadly and much less costly than even chemical agents. However, the biological agents themselves are somewhat difficult to produce, and at this time there is little evidence to support their proliferation for this intended purpose. However, this does not mean that there should be no fear of or preparation for this type of threat.

Nuclear warheads require little discussion. The fact that a nation possesses nuclear technology and a TBM program is enough evidence to concern the world community that the nation could also fit a TBM with a nuclear warhead. This technology is readily available and TBMs lend themselves quite adequately to being the launch vehicle for nuclear warheads. Further, the TBM becomes the only vehicle for transporting the nuclear warhead of a nation that possesses little or no air force to carry out this functional delivery. As already stated, India, with its nuclear capability, could be developing a nuclear warhead for its TBMs because the TBM is the only vehicle that they possess with the capability to deliver such a warhead.

Future Trends

Enhanced technology is adding tremendously to the following aspects of ballistic missiles: accuracy, range, and firepower. There is and will be marked improvements in accuracy because of guidance system improvements. The use and availability of GPS technology will be a key contributor to this improvement. The application of GPS and the Soviet counterpart, GLONASS, will "...simplify launch and guidance problems, greatly increasing the accuracy of future TBMs and hence, their military value."(24) These technologies are openly available and any nation can apply and use them. Guidance systems for TBMs are improving and will continue to borrow from the latest in military and civilian applications and technologies.

Improvements in the accurate positioning of the launcher as well as availability of accurate position data of the target are readily available today. The using nation must accurately emplace a launcher for the missile to be most effective. The TBM launcher is no different. Also, knowing the accurate position of the target makes the accurate launching of the missile easier. Nations can easily obtain current mapping data to better calculate the accurate position of the target. This capability, combined with the above technologies, provides an attainment of TBM impact accuracy as depicted in the information on page 12 of this document. Space targeting is also available. As stated by Colonel John O'Pray, "... one potential space targeting enhancement is the use of radio navigation satellite data to significantly reduce the uncertainties in the positions of both the mobile missile launchers and the targets."(25)

As mentioned, better emplacement of the launch platform achieves improvement in TBM accuracy. There is technology available that will dramatically improve the capability to more accurately emplace the launcher, thereby achieving much improvement in the intended impact accuracy of the missile. There are commercially available GPS receivers that are easily obtainable and relatively inexpensive. A using nation could easily adapt these types of receivers to the TEL to provide for more accurate emplacement. So, "... launcher geolocation accuracy is not a significant constraint on overall RPBM targeting accuracy because either standard geodetic mapping data (for well surveyed regional powers) or available civilian GPS receivers can provide adequate positioning data."(26)

Further, there are satellite capabilities and images available for anyone on the open market. The French government provides these products from their SPOT observation satellites to any buyer. The French government has an open policy towards the dissemination of this information.(27) The SPOT data states that it can reduce geolocation accuracy to less than 30 meters. "Thus, SPOT images will be available to potentially hostile powers either direct from France or through collaboration with non-hostile regional powers."(28) So, through the use of current technologies involving mapping data, GPS and satellite imaging, improvements in launcher emplacement will increase the accuracy of the TBM.

Thus, it is apparent from the above analysis that TBMs currently pose a significant threat to expeditionary forces as well as to any force that is within range of these assets. Also, the improvements mentioned above will greatly reduce the CEP of these weapons giving the TBM relative impunity in attacking a target, but also giving the weapon a much greater chance of hitting the intended target with relatively good accuracy. Further, the lethality and mix of warheads that the weapon can utilize, adds a frightening aspect to the strategic and military utility of this type of missile. Add to this the specter of chemical warheads and the TBM takes on a new gravity, most appalling in its application. The chemically armed TBM suddenly becomes the poor man's nuclear weapon, as well as his strategic air force. This is significant military utility, and "... chemically armed ballistic missiles could represent a major threat to U.S. operations anywhere in the world. They could become a more serious problem than the threat of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles."(29)


At this point I would like to discuss briefly some of the probable countries where USMC units may find themselves deployed. These countries may be in proximity to normal Marine deployments, or quite possibly a direct opponent in armed conflict. Chart 1 also depicts the nations that can pose a TBM threat to Maine expeditionary forces.

Chart 3 highlights the nations that possess not only ballistic missiles, but also those states that possess or are pursuing some kind of chemical capability and are also a declared nuclear weapon state. It is interesting to note that the nations possessing ballistic missiles are also pursuing chemical warheads. Consider that most of these nations are the current "flash-points" in the world or at the very least, areas of serious concern. US forces, specifically Marine forces, can and will find themselves deployed to any of these nations in the near future. We currently support operations in many regions that border these "rogue" states. The USMC is not currently prepared to defend itself against the ballistic missile threat in these regions. Are other Service assets such as PATRIOT going to be available to protect these Marine expeditionary forces? These missile threats will be a challenge to any US forces.

At this point, it is appropriate to discuss the USMC HAWK system and highlight its capabilities and also look at current upgrades to the system which will provide a better ballistic missile defense capability.


So that my description of the HAWK system does not become too laborious and intricate, I am going to assume that the reader has some rudimentary understanding of what the system is and some idea of its basic capabilities. I will keep all discussions of capabilities at the unclassified level. The USMC and the US Army have employed the HAWK system since the early 1960's. The system has been the medium range, medium altitude air defense weapon for both of the services. Many foreign and NATO member nations have also purchased and employed the system as well. The system has evolved over time to improve mobility, reliability, and capability against evolving threats. These threats have included both manned and unmanned aircraft and missiles. Figure 1 that follows depicts the current Phase III configured HAWK platoon in the USMC with its associated major end items.

The HAWK system possesses a semi-active homing missile which is approximately 13 feet in length and weighs about 1200 lb. This missile has a semi-active radar on board and requires that a radar illuminate the target for the missile to home on the target. The missile's radar becomes active as the missile approaches the target and proceeds to achieve a proximity detonation to better accomplish target destruction.

The systems has three primary radars. Think of the pieces of equipment as part of a system, not independent of each other. The first is the illuminator radar, or HIPIR. This radar illuminates the target, thereby providing guidance for the missile. There are two of these in each HAWK platoon in the USMC. The PAR is the medium range (120KM) , medium altitude ( 50,000 ft.) acquisition radar for the system. There is one of these per HAWK platoon. The short range (20 KM), low altitude (40,000 ft) radar is the CWAR Radar. This radar provides excellent capability against low-level targets. There is one of these radars per HAWK platoon. The system has an IFF capability in the IFF transponder which provides the system the capability to challenge and receive various IFF signals including MODE IV (Mode IV is an international military coded IFF response which identifies an aircraft as a true friend).

A command and control van, called the BCP, manages the system. This van houses the launch control personnel (TCO and RO), consoles, computers, and the IFF to both command and control the system. Finally, the system possesses a launcher which holds three missiles when fully loaded. There are three launchers per HIPIR in the active USMC HAWK Platoon, and two launchers per HIPIR in the reserve HAWK platoon. The following point is extremely important. Each HIPIR can engage only one target ; therefore, the USMC HAWK platoon can engage no more than two targets at any given time. This can be a system limitation when trying to defend against a large raid of aircraft or missiles. Figure 2 graphically demonstrates this point.

Figure 2

As stated, the system has been in the inventory since the 1960's, but has undergone several improvements in capabilities or technology, to include the latest Phase III upgrades. These latest improvements significantly enhance the reliability of the system and its capabilities against ECM threats. These upgrades have dramatically improved the HIPIR and the control van. The BCP is a new piece of equipment that significantly improves the management, computing capabilities, and control of the system. Overall, the Phase III improvements provide such dramatic changes to the equipment that renaming the system might have better reflected these new capabilities and improvements to the system.

Also, there have been major efforts by the MARCORSYSCOM and system developers during the period 1988 through 1990 to test and field a capability to deploy a smaller and lighter package of HAWK equipment. These developments revolve around using rugged lap-top computers mixed with line-of-sight VHF radios to allow remote emplacement of the HAWK HIPIR and CWAR. Also, these developments have provided the capability to remote a launcher and HIPIR away from the acquisition radars and the BCP. The additional equipment in the form of lap-top computers and radios allows the system to deploy in much smaller packages and allows much greater distances in emplacement and remoting of fire units. Now you can have a HAWK capability with as little as four end items, greatly reducing footprint and greatly increasing responsiveness to movements and deployments. Figure 3 graphically depicts this capability.

Figure 3

Throughout the years, the system has demonstrated significant capabilities against a vast array of threats, and system developers have consciously upgraded it to keep up with the improvements in aircraft, missile, and ECCM technologies. For purposes of this discussion, the system has always possessed some capability to defend against short range ballistic missiles. This capability dates back to tests conducted in 1961. Also, both in 1988 and again in 1990, the HAWK system completed successful tests against ballistic missile targets, to include SS-21 surrogates. This is significant because both the US Army and USMC have often overlooked this capability. The system has a proven track record of providing a good defensive capability against short range missiles of various types. The Phase III system also has a good capability to defend against cruise missiles. This is also significant, because the services do not have an adequate defense against this type of threat and cruise missiles are growing in proliferation, as are ballistic missiles.

I will now examine what the Marine Corps has currently planned, researched, and developed to improve the USMC HAWK system's capabilities against a broader range of ballistic missile threats. To do this, I will first discuss the BMDO, and how this organization is currently managing many of the TBM programs in all of the services. BMDO is financing the majority of the expenses associated with the upgrades to the HAWK system in the Marine Corps, as well as financing a good portion of the TBM program for the Corps.



BMDO-- Organization and goals

The threat of ballistic missiles prompted the MARCORSYSCOM to pursue improvements to the HAWK system against a wider range of ballistic missile threats. Governmental interest, beginning with former Secretary of Defense, Casper Weinberger and his concern over the proliferation of ballistic missiles in 1988 prompted this pursuit. He directed DOD efforts to determine the impact and seriousness of this threat. Congressional interest followed these efforts, specifically culminating in the TMDI of 1990.

The conference report on FY91 appropriations directed that :

... A U.S. Tactical Ballistic Missile [Defense] system with the necessary capabilities should be fielded as soon as technologically and fiscally feasible. .... [Include] as appropriate... the Navy and the Air Force requirements for Tactical Ballistic Defense systems and programs. The Authorization Act (Sec 225) for FY91 further stated that: It is the sense of Congress to ensure that the Navy and Marine Corps are involved in development programs for future ATBM systems suitable for deployment with their projection and expeditionary forces. (30)

The bottom line is this. Congress desires that all the services pursue ATBM systems befitting their own requirements, but that these systems be interoperable and provide for a seamless, integrated system. Also, the Navy/Marine Corps should develop systems capable of responding to the requirements for force projection and expeditionary operations. In particular, the Navy's system should be commensurate with their deployment and force projection capabilities, and the USMC should develop a system that is light, deployable, and responsive to the peculiar requirements for expeditionary operations.

Congress gave DOD supervision of these efforts which DOD further passed on to the SDIO. Following Desert Storm, Congress provided further guidance. This resulted in the Missile Defense Act of 1991, which dubbed the program, Theater Missile Defense (TMD). This act further applied the following goal:

The development of deployable and rapidly relocatable advanced theater missile defenses capable of defending forward-deployed and expeditionary elements of the Armed Forces of the United States, to be carried out with the objective of selecting and deploying more capable theater missile defense systems by the mid-1990's. (31)

SDIO restructured itself in 1991 based primarily on limited funding in the out-years. Entitled GPALS, this restructure has three major elements, with the first piece responding to Congressional guidance to deploy TMD systems as soon as possible. SDIO defined the TMD element as "...defense against short range ballistic missiles within a theater. .... The other elements or pieces are 'National defense' and 'Global defense'." (32) All three elements taken together will form a defensive shield against the full spectrum of TBM threats.

The SDIO organization became the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization in 1993 and has reflected the current Presidents' "... emphasis on developing ground-based defenses against regional ballistic missile threats."(33)

BMDO sees the evolving TMD architecture as a multi-tiered defense of population centers, high-value assets, and critical mobile military targets. The upper tier will be a long range, high altitude system capable of defending a large area, complemented by a lower tier of point defense weapons. The major anti-tactical (theater) ballistic missile (ATBM) systems currently in development include improved Patriot; Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD); Extended Range Interceptor (ERINT); Corps-SAM; and Aegis/Standard Missile modifications.(34)

In their report to Congress, dated July 1994, BMDO states that the goals for TMD defense involve five areas: (1). A lower tier capability. (2). An upper tier capability. (3). Enhanced warning and surveillance capabilities. (4). Battle Management/Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (BMC3I) capabilities. (5). Capabilities for boost phase intercepts.(35) The following best describes the BMDO plans and approach to fulfilling Congressional intent to counter the TBM threat:

In the near term, an enhanced lower tier intercept capability will be provided by the PATRIOT Advanced Capability-2 (PAC-2) with Quick Response Program (QRP) enhancements and improvements to the AN/TPS-59 Radar and HAWK Weapon System. In the core program, lower tier intercept capability will be bolstered by PATRIOT PAC-3 and modifications to the AEGIS system, including the SPY-1 Radar and the Standard Missile 2 (SM-2) Block IVA; and an upper tier intercept capability will be established with the THAAD missile and the TMD-GBR. Concepts for Corps SAM to further improve and extend to maneuver forces the lower tier intercept capability to protect mobile ground forces; Sea Based Theater Wide Defense systems; and Boost Phase Intercept (BPI) are being considered and the deployment of one or more of these systems will occur after completion of the core program development.(36)

Also, note Chart 9 in the Appendix for a graphical representation of these efforts. This information clearly depicts our government's interest in countering the TBM threat, the organization responsible for executing this effort, and the goals of BMDO as presented to Congress in their report dated July, 1994.

HAWK System Upgrades

As stated above, MARCORSYSCOM is developing improvements to USMC weapon systems in response to the threat and BMDO requirements.

I will discuss the improvements to the HAWK system first, followed by a brief discussion of the other developments to Marine Corps equipment that are part of this TBM defense program for the Corps.

As mentioned, the HAWK system in the Marine Corps is undergoing several improvements to provide a better capability to defend against a broader range of tactical ballistic missile threats. Charts 6 and 11 provide an appreciation of the threats the HAWK system is capable of defeating.

Further improvements to the missile include improving the fuse so that it will have a better chance of a mission kill or even better, a warhead kill against a ballistic missile (mission kill is defined as preventing the TBM from hitting its intended target---warhead kill actually destroys the TBM warhead). This new fuse will not alter the missile's capability against aircraft and will only require a minor upgrade. Also, the upgrade will alter the missile warhead, changing the size of the detonated warhead fragments. The warhead will weigh the same, but the explosive fragments will be larger to have a better chance of taking out the ballistic missile's warhead. Again, this should bear no impact upon the missile's capability against aircraft.

Lastly, the developers will improve software in the BCP to provide better performance against a broader range of ballistic missile threats. This software will improve system performance in both tracking and engagement of ballistic missiles. But, as Chart 6 notes, these improvements to the system will not give HAWK an "all ballistic missile" defense capability. The system will see dramatic improvement in its capability against the divisional and tactical ballistic missile threat, precisely the threat that Marine Forces will most likely face.

Thus far, I have briefly described the improvements to the HAWK system and I must also discuss the associated improvements and developments to two other pieces of equipment that are part of the TBM defense program for the Marine Corps. Chart 7 depicts and describes the three pieces of equipment involved in the USMC TBM program. First, the AN/TPS-59 radar, the long range surveillance radar for the MACS, will receive several improvements. This radar will provide the long range cueing of TBMs for the HAWK system. These improvements will significantly enhance the radar's altitude and range capability to provide better surveillance, tracking, and cueing of the ballistic missiles. These improvements will also decrease the footprint of the system, reducing command and control facility requirements as well as improving computer performance and maintenance requirements. This radar will be the Marine Corps' "eyes", so to speak, in defending against TBMs. These improvements should not impact the radar's requirement to provide for air surveillance against aircraft and missiles, its primary mission for the USMC.

The second part of the TBM program is the development of an ADCP. This HHMMWV based shelter will house resident communications and computer assets to provide the interface between the AN/TPS-59 radar and the HAWK system. The ADCP will also provide via J-TIDS, the TBM target data that the AN/TPS-59 provides. All the services will participate on the J-TIDS WAS. This net will carry command and control data as well as target quality data on any TBMs. The Marine Corps is not currently modifying the TAOC, the facility that controls aircraft and missiles, to provide for the interface between the AN/TPS-59 and the HAWK for the hand-off and engagement of TBMs. The USMC hopes to accomplish this modification sometime in FY's 97-99. So, the ADCP will become, in at least the near term, the interface between the AN/TPS-59 and the HAWK Platoon. Consequently, the ADCP will be a pivotal piece of equipment for the TBM defense system in the USMC and will also provide the rest of the services the TBM data that the AN\TPS-59 has acquired and is processing. Given the fact that the services will go to war jointly, the ADCP becomes critical for providing TBM data from the AN/TPS-59 to the other services via the J-TIDS WAS net.

These systems taken together will comprise the USMC TBM defense capability. With the current configuration of an active HAWK battalion, it will be able to defend ( Figures 1 and 2 ) twelve point targets against ballistic missile threats. The number of HIPIR's limits the number of targets to engage, not the number of missiles available. Again, the system can only engage one target per HIPIR. Also, the keep out zone (area in range and altitude that is the minimum point of engagement of the HAWK missile and the TBM) for the system will be an area of approximately 6 -18 KM downrange and 10-12 KM in altitude above each launcher. So, a platoon with two HIPIRS can defend a point target against two simultaneous TBMs with a keep out zone in range and altitude of approximately 6-18 KM.

The radar upgrades mentioned are currently undergoing engineering developmental testing and the HAWK system upgrades completed a live fire exercise at White Sands Missile Range on September 21, 1994. During this test, the upgraded HAWK system successfully intercepted two of three TBM surrogate targets. (37) The upgraded system intercepted the two targets at a keep out zone of approximately 20 km downrange, and 12 km in altitude. Further, BMDO will receive a demonstration on these improvements in FY96. At that time, the TBM capable HAWK along with the PATRIOT system will be the only ground systems capable of defending against TBMs in the U.S. inventory.

So, primarily in response to Congress and BMDO, the Marine Corps is developing and fielding a near-term ATBM defense capability for Marine expeditionary forces. This capability includes the HAWK system, the AN/TPS-59 radar, and the development of the ADCP. These three pieces of equipment will form the ATBM capability for the Marine Corps.


I have answered several key questions up to this point: Is the TBM threat real and justified? Is this threat serious enough to jeopardize deploying U.S. armed forces, specifically USMC expeditionary forces? I think based upon my analysis and discussion thus far, the answer to the above questions is a resounding yes! But, this also begs a further analysis that is the focus of this paper: Is it appropriate for the USMC to pursue its own ATBM capability?

Given the jointness of today's operations, the Marine Corps will rarely find itself deployed alone on any operation. This jointness provides difficulties for any service to pursue an independent program. This issue is especially significant because of today's shrinking budgets and the difficulty for any service, especially the USMC, to go it alone on any program of significance. However, the USMC should indeed possess an organic TBM capability! This position is especially true given an analysis of the only other system that can realistically provide TBM defense for Marines today---PATRIOT. I will analyze the PATRIOT system at this point and the capabilities it can provide Marine Corps deployed forces. One must look at this system to determine if it can do the job for the Marine Corps to truly determine if the USMC can justify its own current ATBM program. I will conclude with a discussion of the need for the Marine Corps to possess an organic HAWK TBM capability.



To keep this discussion basic, we will consider the PATRIOT PAC-2 as the baseline for TMD. The initial mission and design of PATRIOT was to provide air defense against sophisticated aerial threats until the 1990's. Subsequent improvements have upgraded it to provide limited TBM defense capability. The main organization for the system is the battalion which can consist of up to six firing batteries. The battery is nominally the smallest element capable of independent operations. Chart 10 in the Appendix contains a breakdown of organic equipment.

In the 1980's, the PATRIOT PAC-1 and PAC-2 programs upgraded the system to counter the increasing TBM threat. The PATRIOT Quick Response Program (QRP), initiated in 1991-1992, incorporated lessons learned in Saudia Arabia and Israel to quickly correct Desert Storm deficiencies. These include emplacement, remoting, and radar enhancements. The systems currently deployed in Saudia Arabia and South Korea possess these QRP upgrades.

The Guidance Enhancement Missile (GEM) program will improve missile lethality. A limited number of systems receive this capability in 1995. (38) The system is immensely capable and can provide TBM defense for the US Armed services against many of the threats that exist today. However, there are limitations that the Marine Corps must consider when planning to use PATRIOT to protect its forces.



The PATRIOT system has limitations, and its potential to deploy requires consideration of these limitations if PATRIOT is to provide TBM defense for the USMC. The USMC must consider the following constraints with respect to their impact when providing PATRIOT ATBM coverage for its expeditionary forces.

Equipment Constraints

Chart 10 in the appendix depicts the embarkation data associated with the respective pieces of equipment comprising the system. The PATRIOT launcher for example, weighs 79,030 lbs. The launcher can only go and emplace in certain types of terrain given that it weighs almost 80,000 lbs. This size of equipment requires C-5 transport without having to breakdown the end-items. The USMC should not have to rely on TBM defense given equipment that requires C-5 support to haul it. The system components are just too heavy to be deployed and move with Marine Corps expeditionary forces. For example, it is highly impracticable to think that the PATRIOT launcher can emplace on any surface that is not relatively improved and hard. This will limit the emplacement of PATRIOT and will, therefore, limit the PATRIOT coverage provided to Marine forces. When Marine units move out from under PATRIOT coverage because of operational requirements, PATRIOT may not be able to provide support because of terrain constraints.

PATRIOT requires LVS-type truck support of which there are not enough assets in the USMC that can support PATRIOT Battery movements. It is unrealistic in the USMC to dedicate this kind of truck support to the movement of a PATRIOT unit. Also, even if the US Army provided these trucks, it would still be difficult for vehicles of this size to deploy where Marine Corps forces go. "During Desert Shield and Desert Storm, with months of time to build up our forces, it took over four hundred C-141 equivalents to transport enough PATRIOT in-country to provide limited point defense of critical, high value areas. "(39) Given the USMC's expeditionary nature, PATRIOT's size and weight just does not lend itself to supporting expeditionary operations. Further, the Marine Corps could not afford to give up a large number of C-141 equivalent sorties for deploying PATRIOT to support its units. Conversely, the US Army could not afford to give up precious C-141 sorties to fly PATRIOT to support USMC assets.

One probably questions HAWK and its mobility and deployability at this point. Refer back to Figures 1 and 3 in the text. A 5-ton military truck can transport all HAWK system end items. The USMC and US Army has many such trucks in the inventory. The BCP of the HAWK system is the heaviest, weighing in at approximately 10,000 lbs. So, in comparison to PATRIOT, the HAWK system is smaller, lighter, and more transportable with the smaller family of military trucks. And, when considering Figure 3, utilizing the CFU and SAS concepts allows employment in even smaller packages.

Resource Allocation

Resource and quantity is of paramount importance. There are only so many PATRIOT battalions to go around. Currently, there are nine PATRIOT battalions in the active inventory to support all theater and Army Corps assets. These PATRIOTS are also supporting rotations to support SWA and Korean contingencies. Also, consider the threat in North Korea and the tremendous PATRIOT commitment required to provide ATBM coverage of this possible contingency. And, there is a possibly of simultaneous MRC's which will put even more stress on these nine battalions. PATRIOT is a theater asset, a Joint or Combined force strategic capability. The theater commander will use PATRIOT to defend against TBMs in a strategic role during large operations. The weapon system is not being put to best use if limited to protecting Marine expeditionary forces unless these forces already fall under PATRIOT coverage being provided for a theater. And if Marines move, it is questionable that PATRIOT can rapidly move and redeploy to protect these fast-moving forces.

System Coverage Constraints

Note Chart 11 in the Appendix. The radar coverage fans depicted are typical coverages in altitude and range of THAAD, PATRIOT, and HAWK, given their most likely employment positioning. The chart also takes into account earth curvature, which impacts the coverage of line of sight radar systems. The Chart provides the following results. The theater commander would typically emplace PATRIOT and THAAD, primarily theater assets, well back in the area of operations to best provide coverage for the widest possible area. The radar coverage for these systems begins to drop off (allowing gaps at lower altitudes) at extended ranges due to the curvature of the earth. When SRBM's are the threat, there is a good possibility that they can sneak in under the far end of THAAD and PATRIOT coverage and impact upon forward deployed assets and troops. Also, the short range missile has the least time of flight; therefore, there is the least amount of reaction time available to respond to it. SRBM's will ordinarily be the most stressing threat to the TBM defenses and the most challenging threat to Marine expeditionary forces.

Typically, the Marine Corps emplaces the HAWK with vital areas and assets, as well as with forward elements. The system has the capability to be emplaced at the forward edge of the expeditionary forces objective area to best protect against those SRBM's that can slip under the coverage of the PATRIOT sensors. PATRIOT, as mentioned above, does not lend itself very well to keeping pace with or emplacing in terrain associated with the unimproved maneuver areas of a Marine expeditionary force. Chart 11 graphically depicts HAWK's ability to be a gap filler in TBM defense coverage. HAWK is especially viable at defending against SRBM threats such as FROG's and SS-21's.

I believe the bottom line is this. There are inadequate PATRIOT assets to provide for the defense of theater assets and U.S. Army assets and provide for TBM defense of Marine units. I believe that PATRIOT will not be able to provide TBM defense for Marine expeditionary forces because of the demands that theater requirements will place on the limited number of available PATRIOT systems. Also, and to a lesser degree, PATRIOT will have difficulty providing TBM defense of USMC expeditionary forces because of its limited strategic mobility.

Also, consider what happened during Desert Storm when Iraq launched TBMs against politically sensitive targets in Saudia Arabia and Israel. Will the CINC or NCA deploy PATRIOT to protect important political partners when these countries are helping foster and preserve our national goals during delicately balanced coalition, combined operations? You bet that he will! Consider the number of PATRIOTs used to protect Israel and Saudia Arabia during the Gulf War. Major Earl Ficken states in his article, Tactical Missile Defense: A Chink In Our Armor, "Yet it is this area defense mission or theater strategic defense which the PATRIOT was eventually called upon to perform in reaction to SCUD attacks on Israel and Saudi Arabian civilians."(40) Will this happen again? I believe that it will. And, given that PATRIOT is currently our only national capability that provides limited TBM defense, the NCA will deploy it to protect politically sensitive targets.

I believe, given the above analysis, that there is indeed a very good argument for the USMC to possess an organic TBM defense capability that the HAWK missile system can provide. The threat warrants maintaining and improving this capability. The PATRIOT system can defend against TBMs, but the theater commander will, more than likely, not deploy it solely to defend Marine forces primarily because of limited PATRIOT assets. As discussed, PATRIOT has logistical and size limitations as well. And, most importantly, the theater commander will call upon PATRIOT to protect strategic assets at least until some other weapon systems can take its place. The HAWK system has a proven track record in engaging TBMs, and with the upgrades mentioned it will provide a capability to defend against the divisional and tactical TBM threats that USMC units will more than likely face. The HAWK missile system is in the inventory and can provide this capability until the US Army fields the CORPS-SAM system (the system designated to replace the HAWK missile system in approximately FY 07). Marines will face a TBM threat in just about any contingency, and HAWK is capable of deploying, defending, and keeping pace with Marine expeditionary forces.

Now, I would like to discuss several areas that are part of this issue of TBM defense in the Corps. The first of these is how the Marine Corps should interface this TBM HAWK capability with the other service's systems or other nations' systems. What is the best method to provide these systems the TBM data that the AN/TPS-59 is processing? Secondly, I would like to examine the ERINT missile and discuss some possibilities of how to deploy this missile with a HAWK launcher to truly provide an expeditionary TBM capability.


Chart 9 provides a look at the core programs and the advanced programs that BMDO is attempting to field for the using military services. The main systems that the USMC's TBM capability will need to interface with in the next ten years will be PATRIOT (including it's upgrades QRP, GEM and PAC-3 improvements), the sea-based TBMD assets aboard Aegis (which incorporate improvements to the missile and SPY-1 radar), and THAAD/TMD-GBR (if HAWK is still in the USMC inventory when DOD fields THAAD in FY01). Also, the USMC TBM capability should interface with any type of US Air Force early warning or cueing system upgrades designed for TBM defense and cueing. I will provide a brief description of each service system development or upgrade for TBM defense and will conclude with how best to interface with these systems.

My intention in discussing the interfacing requirements after discussing each program is two fold. First, the requirement to transmit via J-TIDS for TBMs exists for all services and, therefore, DOD levies this requirement on each system. J-TIDS is to be the data link standard for all the services in the near future. Secondly, there may be peculiar technical requirements associated with interfacing with each system, but it is not my intent to get into that level of sophistication or classification. Therefore, I will discuss the interfacing requirements after highlighting each system.


The PATRIOT PAC-3 upgrades will increase the system's lethality and system battlespace capabilities. Improvements will include radar enhancements for range and identification, increased firepower, and enhanced survivability. The Army has chosen the ERINT missile as the PAC-3 missile for PATRIOT. It is a hit-to-kill interceptor and will provide defense against both aircraft and TBMs. This hit-to-kill technology will provide increased lethality in destroying mass destruction warheads.


The THAAD system is undergoing performance and demonstration testing in FY96/97 with possible fielding in early 2000's. This is a US Army system which will provide a complement to PATRIOT, covering the upper tier of a two-tiered defense capability. This weapon system will provide broad surveillance and a large intercept envelope to defeat missiles over a large area. The system will engage at high altitudes to minimize collateral damage and will incorporate a missile capable of intercepting TBMs at long ranges.

The TMD-GBR is the primary sensor for THAAD and will provide theater -wide surveillance and fire control for the system. The radar will detect, track, and provide in-flight updates to the missile prior to intercept. TMD-GBR will provide critical kill assessment capability, which will help in the management of assets and the decisions to commit subsequent THAAD missiles against ballistic missiles or pass the target on to PATRIOT or AEGIS.

Sea-Based Area TBMD

This effort will provide the Navy with a sea-based TBM defense capability, encompassing modifications to the Aegis weapon system and to the Standard Missile. This effort will modify the Standard Missile SM-2 Block IV to better engage the shorter range, lower apogee targets. The SPY-1 radar will also see improvements to computer programs and equipment to allow better search capability at higher altitudes and longer ranges in order to better detect and track TBM targets more effectively. BMDO is considering further modifications to the SM-2 Block IV missile which may incorporate changes to fusing, warhead, and seeker to better engage ballistic missiles in the atmosphere. These upgrades should undergo performance testing and demonstration in FY98 with subsequent initial fielding in FY's 99-00.


All of the systems mentioned above are undergoing various stages of development or testing. The communications medium for either transitioning current systems or future systems will be J-TIDS. J-TIDS is to be the DOD standard data link and will eventually replace such tactical data links as TADIL-A, and TADIL-B. All the above systems have a requirement to participate and

communicate upon some type of J-TIDS network as their primary means of communicating Command and Control (C2) and/or providing/receiving cueing information. As mentioned, there will be a WAS net dedicated to all C2 information and the transmission and receipt of targeting data on TBMs. So, it is J-TIDS that will be the link of choice to interface with all the service systems dedicated to ballistic missile defense. This net will be the medium for the various systems to interface for the exchange of information and the engagement of TBMs.

The ADCP will be the vehicle (at least in the near term (FY96-99)) whereby the USMC can interface with the WAS net and the other TBM systems in the theater. The ADCP will transmit and receive TBM data over J-TIDS and will provide the Marine Corps with the capability to participate and interact with the other service systems. The ADCP is the key--- it will have the capability to interact on J-TIDS and will be the link for the Corps to interface on the WAS net for TBM data. The ADCP can provide TBM data that the AN-TPS-59 detects to the WAS net and can receive TBM data that another sensor or system has processed in the theater. Also, the ADCP can provide the USMC MACCS information on TBMs which will provide situational awareness and early warning.

So, the ADCP will provide the USMC with the TBM capability that will ensure USMC participation in the WAS net for both the receipt and transmission of data on TBM targets in the area of operations. This piece of equipment is flexible, robust, and mobile. It will provide the key interfacing capability for the USMC for TBM defense.


As mentioned, ERINT will be the missile of choice for PATRIOT PAC-3. This missile by design, is to be very modular and should be capable of interfacing with other systems, at least in form and fit. Initial design specifications allowed the missile an easy adaptation to other systems through digital links and an interface with the HAWK system's new mobility digital launcher with few modifications. The ERINT missile obtains updated target information from a ground transmitter. With little effort, the HAWK Mobility Launcher will interface with the ADCP and, if modified, accept an ERINT missile carriage holding several missiles . So conceivably, it would be possible to interface the ADCP with a HAWK mobility launcher loaded with several ERINT missiles. This combination would provide TBM defense when interfaced to the AN/TPS-59 radar, or when cued by another three-dimensional sensor on the WAS net. One could have a TBM defense capacity that far exceeds the HAWK or PATRIOT missile capability with a correspondingly smaller footprint. Further, interfacing this combination of equipment with a HAWK platoon would provide much greater versatility, mobility, and firepower. Moreover, the possibility exists to load several HAWK launchers with ERINT missiles while simultaneously interfacing with other launchers in the platoon loaded with HAWK missiles. The using platoon could then designate HAWK missiles for short range, low altitude threats and the ERINTs for the higher altitude, longer range TBMs. The combinations and the capabilities are almost endless.


I have attempted in this thesis to address the question--- Should the USMC provide for its own organic TBM defense? If so, how should the USMC interface this capability with the other service systems? The answer to the first question is .... YES! As discussed and analyzed, the threat warrants it and the capabilities that PATRIOT provides to protect Marine expeditionary forces just may not be there for several good reasons. Primarily, there just is not enough PATRIOT to go around and it is too large and heavy a system to expect it to provide coverage for maneuvering expeditionary forces.

The Marine Corps must continue to develop and field the HAWK TBM capability. Further, the capabilities of the ADCP are especially significant! Its ability to interface with J-TIDS for TBM data is a tremendous capability and provides the USMC a way to access and interact with other service systems when concerned with critical TBM target data.

The ERINT missile could provide added capabilities to the TBM system in the Marine Corps and could as well, add significant capability to the HAWK platoon. It has more utility than just a missile for the PATRIOT PAC-3 program. This missile added to an ADCP and a HAWK launcher would provide significant TBM capability that would be extremely light, mobile, and most of all, effective!


It should be very clear that the Marine Corps needs HAWK to provide for TBM defense of its expeditionary forces. In conclusion, I think it most appropriate to quote several key senior officers. This highlights, I believe, just

how important they feel this HAWK capability is, as well as stressing positions

that are representative of several key organizations. As mentioned, BMDO is the organization supervising and funding the TBM programs within DOD. Lt Gen. Malcolm O'Neil currently heads this organization. General O'Neil made the

following comments in a memorandum addressed to the Deputy Chief of Staff for

Operations of the US Army, dated November 28, 1994, concerning continued US

Army support for the HAWK system:

Simply put, the purpose of our upgrade program is to provide the Marines with a point defense capability against the short range ballistic missile (SRBM) threat. The Marine Corps Combat Development Command judges the SRBM to be the primary missile threat to expeditionary forces.... Just this past month, Marine operational units conducted a test in which two Lance missiles were successfully engaged and destroyed by improved HAWK missiles.

Eight foreign nations have made formal inquiries to the HAWK Project Office since last months test. There unquestionably is significant potential for this modification to be exported and thereby contribute to our ongoing efforts toward ballistic missile counterprofileration. To state the obvious, I would very much like to see this program come to fruition, not merely because of the investment already made, but because of the much needed capability it will provide.(41)

Gen. O'Neil strongly believes that the HAWK TBM capability is necessary to protect Marine expeditionary forces. It is obvious that he sees tremendous utility for this effort and that such developments have a place both in the Corps and internationally as well. The Director of BMDO obviously feels that DOD needs this effort to provide TBM capable HAWK and that the USMC cannot totally rely upon PATRIOT to do the job.

To bring this closer to home for Marines, I would like to quote the current

Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation for the Marine Corps, Lt. General H.W. Blot.

Gen. Blot delivered these comments in a memorandum to the Deputy Chief of

Staff for Operations of the US Army in which he also expressed his concern for

continued US Army support for the HAWK system. Gen. Blot stated:

The Marine Corps' present force structure calls for two HAWK battalions (one active, one reserve) into Fiscal Year 2007. These battalions fill a critical part of our overall air defense requirement and provide the only Marine Corps theater ballistic defense capability. They also represent the structure we would use to accommodate the

fielding of Corps SAM which enjoys a high Army/Marine Corps priority for the future.(42)

Of particular note is the Generals phrase, "...fill a critical part of our overall air defense requirement and provide the only Marine Corps theater ballistic defense capability." It is obvious that General Blot feels that the HAWK system is critical to the Marine Corps for air defense, and in particular, TBM defense. Also, HAWK is the only capability organic within the Corps to provide this capability. I believe that his expression encapsulates it all.

The HAWK system is crucial for providing TBM defense to the Marine Corps. It will also be the system to help provide air defense for the Corps through the next 8-10 years or until the Corps fields Corps-SAM or some similar system. The TBM threat exists and is expanding in quantity and quality. The Corps will face TBMs in the future. We must provide protection for Marines against the TBM threat and upgrading the HAWK system is the way to go because of its effectiveness, capability, and minimal impact to deployment and employment.

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David Hughes, "Active Army Disbands Last HAWK Battalion", Aviation Week and Space Technology, (April 4, 1994), 33.

2. Lt Col Mussella , Project Officer, Aviation Plans and Programs (APP), HQMC, interviewed by author, 16 December, 1994.

3. Lt Col Kenneth E. Fess, USA, Third World Tactical Ballistic Missiles: A Strategy for Defense, (Pennsylvania: Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College, 1991), 17.

4. David Rubenson, Anna Slovac, The Impact of Missile Proliferation on U.S. Power Projection Capabilities, Rand Note, no. N-2985-A/OSD ( Santa Monica, CA. , 1990), 3.

5. Joseph F.H., Peterson, Lt. Col. USA, Ballistic Missiles Proliferation: A National Security Focus for the 21st Century, (Pennsylvania: Carlisle Barracks, US Army War College, 1994), 9.

6. W. Seth Carus, , Ballistic Missiles In Modern Conflict, (New York, N.Y.: Praeger publishers, 1991), 8-11.

7. Carus, 8-11.

8. Ibid.

9. Carus, 57.

10. Rubenson and Slovac, Rand Note 3.

11. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, CRS report for Congress, Missile Proliferation, Survey of Emerging Missile Forces, Report # 88-642F, (USA: The Library of Congress, 1988, revised 1989), 7.

12. CRS, 7.

13. Robert C. Dodt, Lt Col, USMC, Tactical Ballistic Missile Defense for the United States Marine Corps, ( Washington, D.C.: Fort McNair, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1992),12.

14. Dodt, 12.

15. Peterson, 13.

16. Rubenson and Slovac, Rand Note, figure 8, 13.

17. CRS, 23.

18. Ibid.

19. Carus, 35.

20. Peterson, 7.

21. Rubenson and Slovac, Rand Note, 20.

22. Ibid, Summary.

23. Ibid, 22.

24. David R. Desimone, Lt. Commander, US Navy, Theater Missile Defense Beyond Patriot, (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1994), 7.

25. John E. O'Pray, Colonel, USAF, Regional Power Ballistic Missiles-- An

Emerging Threat to Deployed Forces?, (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University, 1990), 8.

26. O'Pray, 62.

27. Ibid, 64.

28. Ibid.

29. Rubenson and Slovac, Rand Note, 25.

30. Dodt, 5-7.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Desimone, 8.

34. Ibid, 9.

35. Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), 1994 Report to Congress on Ballistic Missile Defense, ( Washington, D.C., 1994),1-4.

36. BMDO 1994 Congress Report,1-5.

37. Raytheon film, White Sands Missile Range test, Sept. 1994.

38. BMDO 1994 Congress Report, 2-8, 2-9.

39. Dodt, 29.

40. Earl L. Ficken, Major, USAF, Tactical Missile Defense: A Chink in Our Armor, ( Newport R.I.: Naval War College, 1992), 13.

41. Director, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization Memorandum to Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, US Army, AQS, subject: "HAWK and Chapparral Systems Force Requirements and Support", 28 November, 1994.

42. Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation Memorandum to Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, US Army, APP-51, subject: "Support for the HAWK System", 14 October, 1994.