Subject: Team B on ASATs (the view from 1976)
From: [email protected] (Allen Thomson)
Date: 1995/10/19
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Newsgroups: sci.space.policy,alt.war,alt.politics.org.cia
I was recently rereading the famous "Team B" alternative
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of 1976 while preparing a
posting for a.p.o.cia and came across the following section on
Soviet ASAT. It's interesting from several points of view, so
I've reproduced the entire available text here (there are many
redactions, unfortunately). I've made some comments in places
where there is information relevant to present-day problems of
satellite vulnerability and other things which interest me.
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Estimating History [i.e., previous NIE assessments]
[One or two paragraphs redacted]
In 1968, the Soviets initiated actual non-nuclear ASAT
testing, a fact which was reflected in the 1969 NIE. By 1971
(Feb), NIE 11-3 noted that a non-nuclear ASAT capability had
been demonstrated, but that "a fully operational system would
require greater flexibility than was displayed in the Soviet
tests." [NIE 11-3-71, p.79, paragraph 207] It was believed hat
the same constraints on ASAT use discussed in earlier years
would continue to prevail, and would, in fact, be reinforced by
the increasing dependence of the Soviets upon their own
satellite systems as well as the effects of the SAL [Strategic
Arms Limitations] negotiations.
It will be very interesting to obtain those 1960s - early 1970s
NIEs to see what the "constraints on ASAT use" were believed to
be, as those probably influenced the way future U.S. systems
like the KH-11 (IOC Jan 1976) were designed.
As far as increasing Soviet dependence on satellites goes, it's
my impression that, at least in a qualitative sense, they never
got to the degree of dependency the U.S. did.
In an August 1971 supplement, the NIE noted that the Soviets
were in a period of frequent ASAT testing, and questioned why
they did not employ a non-nuclear ASAT variant of the Galosh
ABM, which would be capable of direct ascent intercepts and
therefore highly effective against US reconnaissance satellites.
Quite a relevant comment in the present-day context: non-nuclear
direct ascent ASATs, the kind easiest to build, were recognized
as "highly effective against US reconnaissance satellites."
This reasoning let to the view that the ASAT system was a long
range program ultimately directed against the full range of US
space systems which could have originated in response to
hypothetical systems (e.g., orbital bombardment) widely
discussed in the early 1960's, but not introduced.
An interesting notion, but I'd want to see the evidence before
accepting it.
The hiatus in ASAT testing from 1971 to 1976 has led to the
publication of essentially unchanged estimates concerning the
Soviet ASAT system, although Soviet laser capabilities have been
given increasing emphasis as they have advanced. In addition,
in 1974 the NIE noted that the Soviets demonstrated a capability
to place satellites in geostationary orbit, thus potentially
extending their ASAT capabilities to that altitude.
The second sentence contains a point worth bearing in mind as we
sail off into the future: GEO (or even GTO, for crossing shots)
launch capability implies some degree of GEO ASAT capability.
The Evidence
[entire text, approximately two to four paragraphs, redacted]
Darn.
Analysis/Estimate [by Team "B"]
As it currently exists, the Soviet ASAT system has several
operational limitations which must be considered in assessing
its potential utility to the USSR.
(1) Altitude Limitation. This was noted above, and is primarily
a function of the launch vehicle [SL-11]. It could be
alleviated by use of a larger launch vehicle such as the SL-12,
although Soviet views regarding the necessity of testing at
higher altitudes prior to operational use remain unknown.
[ section 2 redacted ]
(3.) Target Capacity. As noted, each target satellite requires a
separate ASAT launch. Although US reconnaissance systems
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
maintain only a small number of satellites, which cannot be
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
rapidly replaced, on orbit
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Aigh! This is *still true today, and is getting worse* as the
"recapitalization/reinvestment" program rolls along. Lots of
people know it now, lots of people knew it then. So what the
hell has been going on in the NRO these past twenty years?
a militarily effective attack upon planned systems (such as
GPS) would seem to require development of an ASAT vehicle
with a multiple engagement capability. [One or two paragraphs
redacted]
While Soviet intentions for the current system cannot be
determined, consideration of its characteristics and limitations
does permit attribution of several potential applications:
(1) Political Use. Demonstration of intent, political "shock"
effects, etc.
True today as well.
(2) Crisis Management. One time denial of information during a
high intensity crisis situation.
Hm. I'd tend to think that the availability of UAVs makes this
less valid in today's world.
(3) Extended Conventional War. Denial of tactical information
over an extended period of time, possibly preceded by or
coupled with lower level antisatellite operations, such as laser
blinding, ECM, etc.
Well, given the small numbers of spysats and long replacement
times, this is probably still important. UAVs might take up
much of the slack locally, but loss of global reconnaissance
would be a serious indirect consequence of satellite destruction
in a regional conflict. It would be interesting to find out
what kinds of industrial lasers could be used for blinding
satellites these days.
Physical satellite destruction may be more
likely as the nuclear threshold is approached. [about four lines
redacted] This would be fully in consonance with Soviet
employment of other space systems, such as their radar ocean
surveillance satellite, in tactical operations.
IMO, "the nuclear threshold" is totally irrelevant today in
talking about ASAT. We'll nuke'm if they use nukes (or just
maybe biological weapons -- not chemicals) on U.S. territory or
troops and not otherwise.
(4) Strategic Research and Development. Provide test and
operational data for use in development of more capable ASAT
systems.
It is worth noting that the second series of Soviet ASAT
tests began about a year after the ABM treaty, which had
significantly constrained the number of ABM launchers that the
Soviets could possess. Since the ASAT system is totally
ineffective in an ABM role, its development may reflect a Soviet
desire to avoid diverting any of their ABM system to an anti-
satellite role, while at the same time acquiring an ASAT system
that could in no way be construed as a violation of the ABM
treaty.
Another interesting dissertation topic: to what extent were
early ABM (and perhaps high-performance SAM??) systems on either
side designed to be usable as LEO ASATs?
Soviet Strategic Objectives: An Alternative View
Report of Team "B"
Intelligence Community Experiment in Competitive Analysis
December 1976
Note:
This document is one part of an experiment in competitive
analysis undertaken by the DCI [Director of Central
Intelligence] on behalf of the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board. The views expressed are those of the authors
and do not represent either coordinated National Intelligence or
the views of the Director of Central Intelligence.
Introductory Remarks:
The mandate of Team "B" was to take an independent look at the
data that go into the preparation of NIE 11-3/8 [on Soviet
strategic forces], and on that basis determine whether a good
case could be made that Soviet strategic objectives are, in
fact, more ambitious and therefore more threatening to U.S.
security than they appear to the authors of the NIEs...
Team Leader : Professor Richard Pipes
Associates : Professor William Van Cleave
: Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, USA (Ret.)
: Dr. Thomas Wolfe, RAND Corporation
: General John Vogt, USAF, (Ret.)
Advisory Panel : Ambassador Foy Kohler
: The Honorable Paul Nitze
: Ambassador Seymour Weiss
: Maj. General Jasper Welch, USAF
: Dr. Paul Wolfowitz, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
Newsgroups: sci.space.policy
From: "Allen Thomson"
Date: 18 Sep 2005 12:05:07 -0700
Subject: 1977 DCI view of tactical use of spysats, vulnerability
A while back I posted some vulnerability-related excerpts from the
famous (or infamous, as you choose to see it) Team B pseudo-NIE:
"Team B on ASATs (the view from 1976)"
http://tinyurl.com/b57uy also
http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/asat/at_951019.htm
The document the following was taken from was published soon after the
Team B report and probably was at least somewhat influenced by it.
1977
Director of Central Intelligence
Report on
The Intelligence Community
DCI/IC 77-4657
SECRET
Approved for Release 2002/05/07:
CIA-RDP83M00171R002100110007-6
-Page 1-
INTRODUCTION
A. Purpose of the Report
This is the first comprehensive report(*) on the Intelligence
Community presented to the President and the Congress by the
Director of Central Intelligence. It is designed to provide an
over-view of the context, significant trends and major
challenges confronting the United States national foreign
intelligence effort from the DCI's perspective on the
Intelligence Community as a whole(**). (U)
(*) The original report, published in January 1977, was
classified Top Secret. This version is being published at the
Secret level to make the report available to a wider readership.
(**) The term "intelligence," whenever used in this report,
should be taken to mean foreign intelligence unless otherwise
specified. [remainder of footnote omitted]. (U)
-Page 20-
National/Tactical Intelligence Interface.
Considerable attention has recently been devoted to problems
related to the conflicting demands of national and tactical
needs for intelligence derived from national systems,
particularly over-head reconnaissance systems. In reality the
problem is three-tiered, involving the needs of national,
departmental and field consumers. Each element has needs and
missions which are unique, and which differ in important
respects from those of the others. The nature of some of these
differing needs is such that certain collection systems cannot
be optimized for one consumer without serious degradation of
their utility to others. Tradeoffs are required, and must be
made from a national perspective. (S)
The current mission of most national intelligence collection
resources is the timely and continuing support of national-
level decision makers involved in policy formulation,
international negotiations, and crisis, control. These systems
are designed to operate in an essentially benign environment. If
we were to redesign our national intelligence capabilities to
operate effectively in both benign and conflict environments, we
would have to make a major investment in system survivability
and the tactical communication and dissemination links and
subsystems. We would also have to consider the impacts of such a
step in terms of effects on aspects of our foreign policy (such
as the Open Skies Agreement. SALT verification, etc.) and on the
overall intelligence budget, including national, departmental,
and intelligence-related* programs. (S)
In effect, we are faced with the dilemma of trading off our
capabilities to support war avoidance and crisis control and our
capabilities to provide tactical intelligence from hardened
national systems at such time as our military forces may be
committed. In reality, the viability of national intelligence
systems as wartime assets remains to be proven. It needs to be
tested in more joint exercises and war games. Such evaluations
would demonstrate the relative capabilities of national and
tactical intelligence assets for support of combat operations,
as well us of the National Command Authority. We must ascertain
what can be accomplished effectively with the systems now in
being, both national and tactical, before we venture into a
massive redesign which would be expensive in terms of money,
time and capabilities. (S)
(*) Intelligence-related programs are those programs which,
while not art of the National Foreign Intelligence Program, are
closely related to it; included are such things as tactical
warning, airborne reconnaissance, ocean surveillance, and
certain training. (C)
-Page 20-
The recent recommendation for a national-level study to provide
the basis for a Presidential decision is the first step.
Planning for more joint exercises involving national systems is
underway and should establish what we can effectively do now.
Simultaneously, the capability of tactical systems to provide
information to the National Command Authority will be tested. On
the basis of what we learn from these initiatives, we can make
informed judgments as to how to proceed in resolving the
interface problem. (S)
As intelligence-related assets become more expensive, complex,
and interrelated with national intelligence assets, it becomes
even more crucial that central control be exercised to prevent
overlap and unnecessary duplication. The Congress has stressed
this point and E.O. 11905 has emphasized the same theme. There
must be the necessary concept, doctrine, policy, and strategy to
assure that we are moving in the right direction. (U)